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ABSTRACT 
During the past 20 years, beside the exponential rise in demand and offer of household services caused 
by changes in demographic and employment trends, Western European countries have experienced a 
significative increase in informal domestic work. Aware of the negative impact that informality may 
have on employees, households and revenue, some legislators have taken specific actions against the 
informal employment in the domestic sector. Many of these normative interventions involve the field of 
Tax Law and their nature is persuasive rather than repressive, since they include fiscal incentives to 
formalisation. With the purpose of finding out if this kind of instruments can be effective against 
informality, the present paper addresses the tax measures implemented by Sweden, France, Belgium, 
Italy and the Netherlands for reducing the informal domestic work. Through a theoretical-qualitative 
analysis it can be observed that some tax measures may change the status quo without eliminating the 
detrimental effects of the informal employment, while others can solve the problem only partially. 
Nevertheless, it has been also found that one of these tax measures —the French one— has the potential 
to promote a stable and long-term inclusion of domestic employment relationships into the legal 
dimension. Due to the merge of adequate tax reliefs and full observance of the principle of equality, the 
French tax measure is potentially effective against the informal domestic work and able to contribute to 
the fulfilment of an important objective sought by the ILO: “Decent work for domestic workers”.  
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1. Introduction 
The domestic work, namely the activity of assistance and/or maintenance performed in or for a 
household is, in Europe, a fast-growing labour sector. During the last 20 years, the demand of 
domestic work has sharply increased due to important changes in demographic and employment 
trends involving ageing population and rise in women’s participation in the labour market. The 
private dimension of the domestic work, which years ago was carried out mainly by family 
members, has been therefore replaced by the external aid of employees engaged in tasks such 
as childcare, eldercare or housekeeping for facing with the challenges of the modern European 
society (Fauve-Chamoux, 2004). In line with the growing demand of domestic work, the offer 
of services provided within the household also increased, due to the raising number of 
immigrant work force and to high levels of unemployment, especially in low-skilled 
occupations, which peaked after the economic recession of 2008. According to the report 
“Building on skills forecast” of the European Centre for Development of Vocational Training 
(CEDEFOP, 2012), the European domestic sector was expected to increase by 10% during the 
2010-2020 decade due to the raise in demand and offer of domestic services. The most recent 
statistics show that, in countries such as Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden 
this occupation got to cover more than 4% of total employment (EC, 2018).  
This scenario has been predicted, by the European Commission in the White Paper on “Growth, 
competitiveness, employment”, as it recommended to elaborate new policies for supporting the 
domestic sector for decreasing unemployment and meeting the needs of the society (EC, 1993). 
Two years later, the employment potential of the domestic sector has been again highlighted by 
the EC, which proposed the implementation of financial and fiscal instruments for encouraging 
households to access domestic services (EC, 1995). The EC reiterated its position in 2012 and 
confirmed that the domestic sector was overwhelmingly important for combating 
unemployment and conferring wellbeing to families and individuals (EC, 2012; Morel, 2012; 
Webb, 2009), while the main efforts for raising awareness towards domestic workers’ labour 
rights have been made by the International Labour Office (ILO, 2011, 2012). The special 
attention paid by the ILO in promoting “decent” labour standards for domestic workers reveals 
the absence of proper regulations and the need to specifically address the issue (ILO & Ramirez-
Machado, 2003). 
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The domestic work is a sui generis employment relationship, characterised by strong personal 
involvement and by a particular, but not necessarily exclusive workplace: the home (Anderson, 
2003; Burnham & Theodore, 2012; Neetha, 2009). Due to these features, it is hard to regulate 
the domestic work with the same rules that commonly apply to other employment sectors and 
it is even harder to enforce them. As a matter of fact, public authorities cannot access at any 
time the private and inviolable space in which household services are carried out and there are 
small chances to detect and punish noncompliant conducts (Mundlak & Shamir, 2008). 
Consequently, this labour sector can become an inexhaustible source of informal employment 
and abusive practices (Du Toit et al., 2013; Razavi & Staab, 2010).  
Nevertheless, in the case of the informal domestic work, opportunity does not always make the 
thief. In Western European countries and in many other states, among the main reasons leading 
to the increase in informal domestic work there is the wish to avoid the burden imposed by 
taxes and social security contributions (Chen, 2011; Suleman, 2015). The labour costs’ 
reduction entailed by the informal domestic work is, on the one hand, the lure of households 
lacking the economic capacity —and public subsidies— to hire “formal” domestic services and, 
on the other, a source of savings for well-off employers. Conversely, employees are less 
motivated to work informally and renounce to social security safeguards, still is not uncommon 
that some of them purposely seek informal occupations for avoiding income tax payments, 
working despite their status of irregular immigrants or preserving the right to public subsidies 
—e.g. jobseeker allowance— (Sargeant, 2014). 
According to the “Etude sur les services à la personne dans sept pays européens” of the French 
Ministry of Economy and Finance, in 2010 the share of informal —and semi-informal— 
domestic work was dramatic and amounted to 70% in Italy, 40% in the Netherlands, 30% in 
France and Belgium and 15% in Sweden (DGCIS, 2011), while EUROFOUND (European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions) estimated that in Europe 
one in five informal activities involved the domestic sector (Williams & Renooy, 2008).  
The mentioned estimates confirm that the informal domestic work is a serious problem to be 
solved, but for this purpose specific measures are needed. General policies aimed at countering 
the informal economy, in fact, are likely to result ineffective against the informal domestic 
work, since they do not consider the peculiarities of this employment relationship (McCann & 
Murray, 2014).  
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2. Tax measures for countering the informal domestic work 
By following the suggestions of the EC (1995), some Western European legislators have taken 
action against the informal domestic work by introducing specific tax measures that incentivise 
the spontaneous access to formal household services (Koettl & Weber, 2012; Morel & 
Carbonnier, 2015). Therefore, instead of totally concentrate their efforts in repressing the 
employers’ abusive conducts, these countries opted for encouraging the formalisation of the 
domestic work and focused their attention in enabling households to hire non-informal domestic 
services. Accordingly, it has been considered that decreasing the costs of the formal 
employment was of primary importance and, with the aim of promoting the sustainable growth 
of this labour sector, states have introduced fiscal incentives like tax credits, tax amnesties and 
exemptions on social security contributions. 
2.1. Tax credits 
Tax credits are fixed amounts or percentages which taxpayers are allowed to subtract from the 
gross tax for reducing the owed income tax. These tax instruments are commonly used as 
incentives to tax compliance and to provide preferential tax treatment to groups of taxpayers 
deserving special protection. 
There are two categories of tax credits: non-refundable and refundable tax credits. The first 
cannot exceed the gross tax liability and can be applied to the point that no more taxes are owed. 
Conversely, refundable tax credits can exceed the amount of tax due and the surplus is returned 
to the taxpayer1. These tax reliefs are always implemented for responding to social and 
economic needs and have long been used for discouraging the resort to the informal economy 
all over the world. Nowadays, most of the European measures aimed at fostering the growth of 
the domestic sector provide for tax credits2 . 
                                                 
1 Countries use different denominations for referring to tax credits and often the meaning may appear unclear. In 
French the refundable tax credit is considered as a “credit d’impôt” (transl. tax credit) while the non-refundable 
tax credit is a “réduction d’impôt” (transl. tax reduction) and in Italy the “credito d’ imposta” (transl. tax credit) 
refers only to the amount deriving from the difference between “imposta lorda” (gross tax liability) and 
“detrazione fiscale” (which according to the international definition is a tax credit). 
2 Denmark was among the first in adopting this kind of measure. In 1994 the tax credit for domestic service 
expenses has been introduced in the Danish legal system, in 1999 it became permanent and in 2004 it has been 
transformed into an elderly care benefit, while in Finland, where the same tax credit exists since 1997, there have 
not been substantial changes (Kvist, Carbin, & Harjunen, 2009). In other countries, like Italy and Spain, tax credits 
for domestic work expenses have been applied at the local level (Simonazzi, 2009). 
  
 
 
6 
Nota  4/2019 
Table 1: Refundable tax credit, France 
Name of the 
measure 
Crédit d’impôt. 
Year 2006, modified in 2017. 
Legal source Loi 2006-1771 of the 30th of December 2006 and Art. 199 sexdecies of the Code général des impôts 
Overlying 
policy 
Borloo-Plan 2005 introduced the CESU (Chèque Emploi Service Universel) for regulating the domestic sector 
in substitution of the previous programmes (CES Chèque Emploi Service and TES Titre Emploi Service). The 
plan provided a service voucher system and the simplification of procedures for hiring domestic services. 
Even if CESU accompanies the tax measure and regulate the domestic sector, the tax relief is not conditioned 
to the use of the service vouchers. 
Purposes 
Reducing the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers and responding to the society’s demand of domestic 
services.  
Tasks 
covered 
Housework, domestic tasks, small-scale gardening and maintenance, child-minding (also provided by specific 
childcare assistants outside the home space, care structures or out-of-hours care in schools), help with school 
homework, preparing meals, assisting older people or other individuals needing personal assistance at home 
(except for medical services), assisting people with disabilities, caring for pets, helping with home-based 
administrative tasks carried out inside or around the household. 
Household-
worker 
relationship 
The domestic service can be purchased from a company which is the domestic worker’s employer or can be 
provided by a domestic worker who is directly employed by the household. 
Relief 
50% refundable tax credit on the costs deriving from the employment of domestic workers. The expenses’ 
ceiling for obtaining the tax credit is EUR (Euro) 15.000 for the first tax year and EUR 12.000 for the 
following years (thus, the maximum tax credit is EUR 7.500 for the first year and EUR 6.000 for the following 
years). The expenses’ ceiling can be increased by EUR 1.500 per dependent child and family member older 
than sixty-five until a maximum of EUR 15.000 (EUR 18.000 for the first tax year). In specific cases the limit 
is raised to EUR 20.000. 
Beneficiaries  
Individuals employing domestic workers or purchasing domestic services by professional providers are 
eligible for a refundable tax credit.  
Operating 
mode 
People can apply for refundable tax credits by including the expenses for domestic services in yearly income 
tax declaration. 
Estimated 
impact  
The estimates on the reduction of the informal domestic work after the introduction of the tax measure are 
unreliable and most of the times the assessment has been made on the entire strategy (the Borloo-Plan) rather 
than on the outcomes of the tax reliefs. By way of example it can be reported that the predictions of Marbot 
(2008) —according to which the informal domestic work was expected to decline to around 70% even before 
the reform of 2017— have been wrongly used as estimations, hence numerous misunderstanding in the 
evaluation of the impact of the tax measures arose.  Some media that are against the recent proposal of the 
French government to reduce the tax credit, reported that the non-refundable tax credit decreased the informal 
domestic work by 30% in a decade (Renault, 2019). 
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3 The term “expenses” refers to the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development) 
definition of labour costs: “the sum of gross wage earnings, employer’s social security contributions and 
payroll taxes” (Taxing Wages 2015, OECD publishing, Paris). 
4 From 2017, repairs of appliances at home, IT services and removal services for relocation are also 
included. 
5 VAT included. The Value Added Tax is always due when a service is purchased by a service provider, as 
in the Swedish case. 
Table 2: Non-refundable tax credit, Sweden 
Name of the 
measure 
RUTavdrag - refund of expenses related to cleaning, housekeeping and laundering3. 
Year 2007, modified in 2009, 2015 and 2017. 
Legal source Lag 2007:346 om Skattereduktion fur Hushulls Arbete (Law No. 346 of 2007 on tax credits for housework). 
Overlying 
policy 
RUTavdrag and ROTavdrag (Renovering, Ombyggnad, Tillbyggnad is a similar tax credit for the expenses 
related to home repairs and maintenance) are part of the same strategy aimed at decreasing unemployment 
and informality. 
Purposes 
Reducing the expenses related to the formal employment of domestic workers for decreasing the high 
unemployment rate, breaking down the existing barriers to social and gender equality and combating the 
informal economy. 
Tasks covered Simple cleaning tasks, clothes care, snow removal, gardening and childminding4.  
Household-
worker 
relationship 
The domestic service is provided by a company (professional provider) which is the domestic worker’s 
employer. The household purchases the domestic service from the company without contractual 
responsibilities towards the domestic worker. 
Relief 
50% non-refundable tax credit on the domestic services’ price up to SEK (Swedish Crown) 50.000 for over-
65 and SEK 25.000 for the other tax payers5. The non-refundable tax credit is applied to the point that no 
more income tax is owed. 
Beneficiaries  Individuals subject to income taxation who purchase domestic services from a domestic service company. 
Operating 
mode 
In the original version of the RUTavdrag purchasers of the domestic services had to pay to the professional 
provider the total price of the service and apply for the tax credit in their income tax declaration form. Due 
to a reform of the measure, since 2009 domestic service providers charge the purchasers half of the service 
price, including VAT (Value Added Tax). The providers are then allowed to ask the remaining sum to the 
Swedish Tax Agency.  
Estimated 
impact  
According to the survey conducted by Almega (Employer and Trade Organisation for the Swedish Service 
Sector) in 2009 and by the Swedish Tax Agency in 2011, the informal domestic work decreased by about 
10% between 2005 and 2010, but the percentage might be lower if the numerous frauds which affected the 
RUTavdrag were considered (Skatteverket, 2011). 
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Name of the 
measure 
Réduction d’impôt (in French) or Belastingvermindering (in Flemish). 
Year 2008. 
Legal source 
Reform of the Belgian Tax Code introduced by the art. 70-72 of the Loi-programme of the 8th of June 2008 
and Sixth Reform of the Belgian State of 2015. 
Overlying 
policy 
The 2008 reform modifies only partially the tax relief provided since 2004 to households purchasing domestic 
services through the system of titre service (service voucher), by transforming the existing non-refundable tax 
credit into a refundable one, while the Sixth Reform of the Belgian State of 2015, shifted the taxing —and 
subsiding— authority to Regional Governments. Due to this reform the voucher system has not changed in 
the Flemish Regions, while in Wallonia and Brussels the tax credit has been reduced. 
Purposes 
Favouring the employment of low-skilled workers, discouraging the informal domestic work and helping 
every citizen to achieve a better work-life balance by delegating certain household chores.  
Tasks 
covered 
Domestic services carried out both inside the house (cleaning, ironing, preparing food and doing occasional 
sewing work) and outside (ironing, shopping, supervised transport of persons with reduced mobility). 
Household-
worker 
relationship 
The domestic service is provided by a company (professional provider) which is the domestic worker’s 
employer. The household purchases the domestic service from the company without contractual 
responsibilities towards the domestic worker. 
Relief 
30% refundable tax credit on the vouchers’ price applied on the personal income tax, up to EUR 440,10 (EUR 
2,70 per voucher for the first 163 vouchers purchased) in the Flemish Regions. In Wallonia and Brussels, the 
maximum tax relief has been reduced after the Sixth Reform of the Belgian State of 2015 and now it is, 
respectively, EUR 135 (EUR 0,90 per voucher for the first 150 vouchers) and EUR 220,05 (EUR 1,35 per 
voucher for the first 163 vouchers purchased). 
Beneficiaries  Individuals, subject to income taxation, purchasing domestic services through service vouchers. 
Operating 
mode 
The tax credit is strictly related to a system of subsidized vouchers that allows the purchase of domestic 
services for 9-10 EUR/hour, with a saving of 40% with respect to the total cost of one hour of service. The 
amount of tax credit is calculated on the price of these titles (9 EUR/voucher for the first 400 vouchers, 10 
EUR/voucher for the other vouchers), which can be freely acquired, up to a maximum of 500 per person 
(2.000 in the case of single-parent families or with elderly/disabled members) through Sodexo, a private 
intermediary company. People can apply for refundable tax credits by including the expenses for domestic 
services in yearly income tax declaration. 
Estimated 
impact  
The GAW (Austrian Association for Applied Economic Research) estimated that between 10% and 15% of 
the informal domestic work has been formalised after the introduction the refundable tax credit into the titre 
service system. The evaluation is confirmed by the survey of Idea Consult, a Belgian research-based 
consultancy company, which estimates that the employment relationships which have been formalised were 
10% minimum and 20% maximum (Pacolet, De Wispelaere, & Cabus, 2010). However, in the most recent 
reports, the same consultancy company tends to be less optimistic, especially with reference to the regions in 
which the tax credit has been drastically reduced (Goffin, Schooreel, Mertens, Valsamis, & Van der Beken, 
2018). 
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2.2. Tax amnesty 
The tax amnesty is an instrument of Tax Law aimed at regularising the noncompliant status 
of taxpayers during a specific time-frame. Through tax amnesties, in exchange of 
forgiveness, the state charges a lump-sum of money which compensates the unpaid tax. 
The application of this type of measure in the ambit of formalisation strategies responds to 
the objective of regularising informal activities or employment relationships by freeing the 
parties involved from the responsibility of their previous noncompliance with tax duties. 
The tax amnesty implemented by Italy in 2009 for favouring employees and employers’ 
compliance with tax and social security duties, is probably one of the clearest examples of 
this regularisation measure in the domestic sector (Table 4). 
2.3. Exemption on social security contributions 
Tax exemptions are fiscal reliefs dispensing totally or partially from a tax payment. They 
are statutory exceptions to tax rules concerning taxable incomes on which, for specific 
purposes, no tax is levied. Exemptions can be objective, and refer to a particular type of tax, 
or subjective and apply to specific group of taxpayers, as well as temporary or permanent  
(Rosembuj, 2007). 
Although tax exemptions are commonly used for favouring the access to the legal 
enjoyment of resources otherwise hard to reach, the resort to these instruments for reducing 
the personal income tax base is unusual and they have been scarcely implemented in the 
ambit of formalisation policies, but many countries apply this tax relief in order eliminate, 
totally or partially, the duty to pay social security contributions. 
The Netherlands introduced a subjective and permanent exemption on social security 
contributions with the Regeling dienstverlening aan huis (Table 5). 
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Table 4: Tax Amnesty, Italy 
Name of the 
measure 
Sanatoria per colf e badanti. 
Year 2009. 
Legal source Legge 102 of the 3rd of August 2009. 
Overlying 
policy 
None. The policy is the tax measure itself. 
Purposes Reducing the informal domestic work and the employment of irregular immigrants in the household. 
Tasks 
covered 
Activities carried out by badanti, in charge of the care of non-self-sufficient people, and by colf engaged in 
housekeeping activities.  
Household-
worker 
relationship 
The domestic worker is directly employed by the household. 
Relief 
One-month time-span (September 2009) for regularising the informal employment relationship with one or 
two domestic workers and obtaining forgiveness from past noncompliant conducts. The tax amnesty also 
provided the regularisation of illegal immigrants employed as domestic workers. 
Beneficiaries  
Italian, EU citizen and immigrants residing in Italy with a regular residence permit, who were employers of 
maximum of two badanti or one colf , declaring an income exceeding EUR 20.000, or families declaring more 
than EUR 25.000.  
Operating 
mode 
Domestic employers had to declare to the public labour office or to the immigration office that they had 
employed an informal domestic worker during —at least— the three months preceding the demand of 
sanatoria. For regularising the status of domestic workers, the payment of a lump-sum of EUR 500 was 
required as a compensation for the social security contributions that had not been paid during the three months 
of informal employment, but higher amounts would have been collected if the employer had declared a 
duration of the informal employment relationship exceeding three months. The formal labour contract which 
attested an employment relationship of at least 20 hours per week was also compulsory for obtaining the 
sanatoria. 
Estimated 
impact  
The 294.774 applications received for regularising informal workers by Italian authorities cannot give a 
precise evaluation on the effectiveness of the sanatoria because reliable estimations on the size of the informal 
domestic work in Italy before the introduction of the tax measure are not available. Additionally, it has been 
found that the tax amnesty has been used for fraudulent purposes, because most of the applications submitted 
was not compiled by domestic employers but by fraudsters ensuring the regularisation of illegal immigrants -
—who were not domestic workers— upon the payment of staggering fees (Barbieri, 2009; Pasquinelli & 
Rusmini, 2010). 
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3. Theoretical-qualitative analysis on the effectiveness of the tax measures 
The five tax measures seek to promote compliance through incentives to the formal 
employment of domestic workers and, even in those cases in which countering the 
proliferation of informal practices is not a primary purpose, these instruments can have a 
Table 5: Exemption on social security contributions, The Netherlands 
Name of the 
measure 
Vrijstelling voor de loonheffingen voor deeltijd huishoudelijk personeel (payroll taxes exemption for part-time 
domestic workers). 
Year 2007. 
Legal source Regeling dienstverlening aan huis (Regulation of domestic services) of the 1st of January 2007. 
Overlying 
policy 
Regeling dienstverlening aan huis is a policy that simplifies employment procedures for households 
employing domestic workers. The payroll taxes exemption for part-time domestic workers is included in this 
measure. 
Purposes Expanding the domestic sector and reducing the informal work by introducing fiscal incentives. 
Tasks 
covered 
Cleaning, housekeeping, simple care, shopping, childminding, car driving or gardening. 
Household-
worker 
relationship 
The domestic worker is directly employed by the household. 
Relief 
The informal employment relationship is considered as formal if the domestic work does not exceed three 
days a week and there is a total relief from the employer’s obligation to pay employee’s social security 
contributions. 
Beneficiaries  Individuals employing a domestic worker for a maximum of four days a week. 
Operating 
mode 
None. Absence of a duty to communicate to the Dutch authorities the existence of a domestic work 
relationship. A contract between the parties is required in order to establish working time, tasks and salary, 
but there is no obligation to report it to public authorities.  
Estimated 
impact  
The elimination of employment formalities and duties may result in a massive regularisation of the informal 
domestic sector by the mere fact that the domestic work carried out for a maximum of three days a week for 
the same employer is always —and without the need to provide any evidence— considered formal. 
Evaluations on the impact of the tax measure on the informal economy cannot be done, because the lack of 
communication between public authorities and parties involved in a part-time employment relationship in the 
domestic sector impedes to differentiate between formal and informal work. 
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significant impact on the informal economy’s decline. This assumption arises from a 
compelling correlation that is, at the same time, a logical causal nexus: incentives to 
compliance tend to produce disincentives to noncompliance.  
At this point, it is worth questioning to what extent the implementation of tax measures may 
reduce the informal domestic work in an inclusive way. Throughout the descriptive tables 
of the five measures implemented in Western Europe, some information regarding their 
estimated impact on the informal economy has been mentioned. Nevertheless, these surveys 
and estimations have not been able to provide a clear framework about the extent to which 
tax measures contributed to reduce the informal domestic work. While awaiting more 
precise assessments, the tax measures’ effectiveness can be only theorised, and this is the 
reason why legal and practical aspects of each tax measure have been subject to a 
theoretical-qualitative exam. Such an analysis does not deal with the “quantum” but on 
“how” a normative intervention belonging to the field of Tax Law may promote an inclusive 
formalisation in the domestic sector. For this purpose, tax measures’ subjective and 
objective ambits —namely beneficiaries involved, and the relief provided— have been 
specifically addressed. 
3.1. France 
From an objective point of view, the French measure is highly inclusive because it offers 
the possibility to contract formal domestic services and enjoy all the legal guarantees 
provided in the sphere of the official economy at an affordable price —which is very similar 
to that of informal services.  
The opportunity to regain half of the money spent on domestic services up to EUR 7.500 
during the first year represents an important incentive to formalization. Additionally, from 
the second year onwards all taxpayers can continue to benefit from a refundable tax credit 
not lower than EUR 6.000. As a consequence, the link between households and formality is 
likely to become strong and stable.  
With regard to the subjective aspect, the French measure has proved very effective and this 
is due both to the provision of more favourable treatments for households in need, and to 
the implementation of a series of reforms to expand the number of potential beneficiaries.  
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The original version of the French measure entered into force in 1991 and consisted of non-
refundable tax credits. The effectiveness of the tax measure was partial, and the informal 
domestic work remained the preferred option for those taxpayers who could not discount 
the tax credit from their income tax. In 2006, the introduction of the refundable tax credit 
conferred a higher redistributive potential to the tax relief, because it  gave to taxpayers the 
opportunity to obtain a refund of the tax credit that exceeded the owed income tax. 
Nevertheless, for being eligible for a refundable tax credit, individuals had to —actively 
and formally— work or be registered in the public jobseeker lists since at least 3 months. 
Thus, the access to the tax relief was practically denied to retired people and to individuals 
not included —or included since less than 3 months— in jobseeker lists. The exclusive 
effect of the norm foreseeing the refundable tax credit was even increased in the case in 
which married couples or civil unions (PACS) were subject to joint income taxation, 
because both individuals had to comply with the mentioned conditions. It can be argued that 
individuals not inscribed into jobseeker lists were excluded only temporally from the benefit 
provided by the tax measure, but such a limitation looks anyway contrary to the principle 
of equality. Older people, however, could be considered the most penalised category of 
taxpayers because, being retired, they would never be authorised to apply for refundable tax 
credits (Carbonnier, 2009; Morel, 2012, 2015).  
The subjective limitations of the French refundable tax credits have been overcome in 2017, 
since the legislator reformed the tax code to allow every citizen to benefit from the 
refundable tax credit. Accordingly, the inclusive effectiveness of the tax relief has become 
very high and so are the country’s chances to eliminate the informal domestic work. 
3.2. Sweden 
Being a non-refundable tax credit, the measure introduced by the Swedish legislator is apt 
to promote the purchase of domestic services through formal mechanisms to the extent that 
purchasers have a sufficient amount of due income tax on which the tax credit can be 
discounted6. Consequently, the measure raises some criticism in the light of the principle of 
equality, because it may not apply to low income people. Thus, in spite of being designed 
                                                 
6 The only way to obtain the part of tax credit that exceeds the owed tax is through redistribution, that is, by 
transferring this amount to the spouse or de facto partner who has enough owed tax to deduce it.   
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to favour a vulnerable group —a higher deduction ceiling is allowed to people over 65— 
the Swedish measure cannot aspire to be totally inclusive from a subjective point of view.  
As regards the objective ambit, it looks clear that this measure is by far less generous than 
the French one, as the deduction ceiling is very narrow. However, it cannot be overlooked 
that the list of “deductible” services of the RUTavdrag is more succinct than the one that 
appears in the regulation of crédit d'impôt. Hence, it could be assumed that the limitation 
of the objective scope of the Swedish measure is motivated both by a lower demand for aid 
in the domestic ambit and by the presence of other support programmes for families. The 
veracity of this hypothesis can be supported by alleging that services for old and not self-
sufficient people, as well as pre-school and extracurricular activities, are highly subsidised 
according to the income level of the household. In addition, it has been proven that the 
reduction of the deduction limit for persons under 65 introduced by the 2015 reform has not 
had a negative impact on the number of tax credits demanded and granted in subsequent 
years7.   
3.3. Belgium 
The recent modifications of the Belgian Constitution prevent the tax measure from passing 
with resounding success the theoretical-qualitative examination on the inclusive 
effectiveness. What stands out, especially at the subjective level, is that this is not in line 
with the principle of equality, because the amount of deductible expenses varies 
significantly from one region to another, thus, from person to person. This fact, strictly 
related to the different financing capacity of each region, could lead to a greater 
concentration of informal domestic work in the less wealthy areas of the country. In 
addition, it should be noted that, although the measure allows the purchase of more 
subsidised vouchers to single-parent families and to families with elderly/disabled 
members, the tax credit is fixed and does not provide for any preferential criteria to favour 
those who require greater assistance.    
Regarding the objective area, it is important to recall that the incentive offered by the 
Belgian legislator consists of two elements: a subsidy of 40% on the price of one hour of 
                                                 
7 Updated statistics are available at: https://abouttime.se/rutbarometern/, retrieved the 21st of February, 
2019. 
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domestic services and a refundable tax credit that, depending on the region, can be 30%, 
15% or 10% of the expenses in service vouchers, up to 163/150 vouchers. Thus, families 
residing in Flanders have the possibility to pay 3-4 hours of domestic services per week at 
6,30 EUR/hour, those in the Brussels Region at 7,65 EUR/hour and those in Wallonia at 
8,10 EUR/hour. In addition, if households need more domestic services, they can continue 
to hire them at the subsidised price of EUR 9 or 10 up to 500 vouchers (or more if 
household’s members have special needs). Therefore, all those people seeking cleaning 
services, ironing of clothes, preparation of meals, sewing, shopping and assistance in the 
transport of persons with reduced mobility at an economic price, can find in the Belgian 
measure a valid alternative to the informal domestic work. Conversely, those who need 
different domestic services or greater flexibility with regard to tasks, may continue to hire 
informal workers, as the voucher system can only be used for specific services. In particular, 
this could be the case for older and/or people who need more care, assistance in medication 
and help with their personal hygiene, and in the case of bad-off families with minor 
children8. 
3.4. Italy 
Unlike the other tax measures, the Italian sanatoria provided an economic benefit which 
was not a discount related to the cost of household services. The tax measure, specifically 
designed for stimulating the formalisation of informal domestic workers employed in 
private households, may apparently look as one of the most effective, but this is not the 
case. 
From a subjective point of view, the Italian tax measure cannot be considered totally 
effective and some criticism on the grounds of the principle of equality can be raised, 
because only individuals declaring an income exceeding EUR 20.000 —or families 
declaring more than EUR 25.000— could regularise their informal domestic employees. It 
should be pointed out, however, that the Italian legislator, provided for an increased 
horizontal equity because both residents and immigrants had been included into the tax 
measure, with the result that the tax amnesty became also an additional mechanism for 
                                                 
8 To subsidize expenses related to the care of the elderly there is no other measure and for the care of 
minors there is only a non-refundable tax credit for deducing 45% of the expenses. 
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regularising those who did not hold of a valid residence permit —irregular immigrants. 
Nevertheless, in spite of this praiseworthy characteristic, it cannot be underestimated that 
the possibility to regularise informal domestic workers was precluded to the poorest 
employers and that, by reason of their low ability-to-pay, these individuals had no other 
chances than resorting to the informal labour market. 
If the analysis is shifted to the objective ambit of the tax measure, the evaluation on the 
effectiveness of the tax amnesty for solving the problem of the informal domestic work 
encounters further causes of criticism. The main reproaches to the Italian sanatoria regard 
its inaptitude to be a valid instrument for countering the informal domestic work and its 
inability to promote a stable inclusion of the informal domestic work into the formal 
economy. The first critique can be easily exhausted by reminding that the tax measure has 
been applied only during one-month, thus it may be considered as a long-term solution only 
in the hypothetic situation in which, since the 30th of September 2009, no more households 
would have employed informal domestic workers. The unlikelihood of this prediction in 
reality concerns the second critique to the tax measure and in particular its inadequacy to 
confer to domestic employers some incentives for remaining compliant with the duties 
related to the formal employment. The formalisation of the employment relationship 
provided by the tax measure eliminated the risk of being sanctioned for the noncompliance 
with labour and tax rules, but this cannot be regarded as a direct benefit. In point of fact, 
the sanction is not a deterrent nor an obstacle to the informal domestic employment, since 
—as said— the chances to be detected are very small.  
3.5. The Netherlands 
The Dutch tax measure is, apparently, a tax relief from the payment of the domestic workers 
social security contributions and applies to every individual employing a domestic worker 
in her/his household for less than four days per week, without exceptions. Consequently, at 
first sight it may be considered in line with the principle of equality in terms of access to 
the measure and subjectively effective for its ability to include a relevant number of 
domestic employers.  
The effectiveness of the tax measure, however, is not confirmed by the in-depth exam of 
the tax relief. Provided that the Dutch exemption does not shift the duty to contribute to the 
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public authority, the economic burden of the tax measure is entirely borne by the domestic 
worker. Thus, the tax relief conferred to the employer becomes a potential tax burden for 
the employee who, for providing for her/his social security, has to pay special insurance 
plans. The benefit provided to employers is therefore detrimental to workers, because they 
are obliged to choose whether to pay for their social security or renounce to it as if they 
were informally employed. Unlike the other tax measures, the legislative intervention does 
not lead to the inclusion of all the parties involved in a domestic work relationship into a 
legal system granting and respecting the fundamental rights of every citizen, because from 
the application of the tax measure does not derive any enhancement to workers’ conditions. 
As a matter of fact, it should be noted that, despite some criticism about the other tax 
measures arose, there has been no need to address or examine issues related to the 
consequences deriving from the application of tax reliefs, because improvements to 
domestic workers’ conditions are implicit in the formalisation.  
The Dutch legislator does not provide for an effective solution to the problem of the 
informal domestic work, since the tax measure cannot be considered as a proper tax relief 
nor as a formalisation procedure, but rather a method for laundering the informal domestic 
work. According to the objective ambit, in fact, it cannot be said that the benefits brought 
by the exemption on social security contributions create conditions which are different from 
those of the informal employment.  
By eliminating every obligation to report to public authorities the existence of part -time 
domestic employment and to pay for employees’ social security, the tax measure locates 
workers and households in a hypothetic “limbo” between informal and formal domestic 
work where there are all the cons of informality and no pros of formality. 
4. Conclusions 
The analysis of the five tax measures confirms the important role of Tax Law in designing 
solutions to the problem of the informal economy and highlights that, while combating the 
informal domestic work, tax measures can also balance and take into account all the 
essential interests involved in domestic employment relationships. 
The use of tax reliefs as incentives to formalisation seems to be a valid option for 
stimulating the tax compliance of all parties, however, depending on the size of the benefit 
provided and on the number of beneficiaries who can access it, tax measures can reach 
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different degrees of effectiveness. The merger of an adequate benefit with an all -embracing 
range of beneficiaries determines the tax measures’ maximum inclusivity and this will be 
probably demonstrated by France in future quantitative studies. As a matter of fact, it has 
been found that, by overcoming some of the subjective and objective limitations that the 
Swedish and the Belgian tax credits have, the French tax measure is potentially able to 
effectively tackle one of the most important determinants of the informal domestic work: 
the high costs of formal employment.  
Conversely, in the case of the Italian tax measure, the potential to stimulate the access and 
the permanence into the formal domestic sector is low and may only derive from the 
expectation of a collateral advantage: reducing of the risk of being sanctioned for the 
noncompliance with regulations.  
Similarly, the Dutch tax measure has been considered scarcely effective, as it has been 
observed that it modifies status quo without leading to real formalisations. 
Theoretically speaking, it can be therefore concluded that for reaching the highest level of 
effectiveness in solving the problem of the informal domestic work, tax measures must 
involve adequate tax reliefs and observe the principle of equality, because this is the only 
way to turn formal household services into a valid alternative to cheap informal labour on 
a large scale.  
Demographic trends suggest that, due to changes in the European social structure, the 
demand of domestic services is likely to increase; for this reason, in the absence of inclusive 
formalisation mechanisms, the informal economy will dramatically grow leading to a 
dreadful impact on both economy and society. Therefore, full efforts should be devoted in 
restoring the legality in the domestic sector and this implies real formalisation with real 
enhancement of both workers’ labour conditions and households’ ability to access to 
adequate services (IWAK 2011). These priorities, repeatedly expressed by the ILO in its 
claims for “Decent work for domestic workers”, have to frame future budget policies ; thus, 
tax measures are not exempted from complying with such recommendations while pursuing 
the elimination of the informal economy.   
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